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Public perceptions of both risks and regulatory costs shape rational regulatory choices. Despite 
decades of risk perception studies, this article is the first on regulatory cost perceptions. A survey of 
744 U.S. residents probed: (1) How knowledgeable are laypeople about regulatory costs incurred to 
reduce risks?, (2) Do laypeople see official estimates of cost and benefit (lives saved) as accurate?, 
(3) (How) do preferences for hypothetical regulations change when mean-preserving spreads of 
uncertainty replace certain cost or benefit?, and (4) (How) do preferences change when unequal 
inter-individual distributions of hypothetical regulatory costs replace equal distributions? 
Respondents over-estimated costs of regulatory compliance, while assuming agencies under-
estimate costs. Most assumed agency estimates of benefits are accurate; a third believed both cost 
and benefit estimates are accurate. Cost and benefit estimates presented without uncertainty were 
slightly preferred to those surrounded by “narrow uncertainty” (a range of costs or lives entirely 
within a personally-calibrated zone without clear acceptance or rejection of tradeoffs), and more 
preferred than  “wide uncertainty” (a range of agency estimates extending beyond these personal 
bounds, thus posing a gamble between favored and unacceptable tradeoffs), particularly for costs 
versus benefits (but even for costs a quarter of respondents preferred wide uncertainty to certainty). 
Agency-acknowledged uncertainty in general elicited mixed judgments of honesty and 
trustworthiness. People preferred egalitarian distributions of regulatory costs, despite skewed actual 
cost distributions, and preferred progressive cost distributions (the rich pay a greater-than-
proportional share) to regressive ones. Efficient and socially-responsive regulations require 
transparency about both risks and regulatory costs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In order to gauge whether any technology, regulation, or inaction “does more good than 
harm,” it makes no sense to study only the good or only the harm. Specifically in determining 
whether a given health and safety regulation is worth proposing or adopting, there are great virtues 
in taking a balanced approach to studying both the risks that might be reduced and the costs that 
might be incurred.(1) In general, risk and cost analyses merit similar analytic intensity and rigor, 
presentation clarity and honesty, individualization, valuation of individual and social utilities, analysis 
of countervailing (risk-risk; cost-cost) effects, post hoc corroboration, and study of lay and expert 
beliefs. For many such desirable attributes, however, particularly with regard to the analysis of 
uncertainty, far more attention has been paid to these desiderata in risk assessment than in cost 
assessment.(2)   
 This article is to our knowledge the first that evaluates lay understanding of and reactions to 
regulatory costs, including their uncertainties and the incidence of those costs across affected 
consumers and producers. Scholars have studied intensely how individuals process and react to 
information about risk, including lay beliefs and attitudes about toxicology(3) and exposure(4), risk 
aversion and risk taking(5, 6), responses to uncertainty in risk estimates(7), and individual differences, 
as in cognition and by demographics.(8, 9, 10) They also have studied responses to information about 
private costs (e.g., prices(11), present versus future costs(12), fairness of taxes(13)), but not how citizens 
process and react to information about social costs, particularly regulatory costs. Progress in 
understanding—and thence in reducing—miscommunication or allegedly irrational responses to risk 
information cannot begin to be replicated on the “cost side” of regulatory policy until we gauge the 
baseline of “regulatory economic literacy” and perception of regulatory costs, and probe reactions 
to changes thereof. This paper reports results of a path-breaking and therefore broad pilot study of 
lay “cost perception,” involving a psychometric survey with respondents numerous and diverse 
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 This article is part of a larger project1 on analytic, methodological, cultural, and ethical 
differences between risk assessors and regulatory economists.(1, 14, 15, 16, 17) Perceptions of regulatory 
costs are covered here. In a subsequent companion piece to this article we will explore the relevance 
for the “value of a statistical life” (VSL) literature of a novel method for eliciting judgments about 
costs-lives tradeoffs first developed in the survey discussed here. (18) 
This paper focuses on four basic research questions:  
(1) How well-informed are laypeople about the costs of regulations? This parallels prior studies of 
basic economic knowledge about prices, taxes and other economic topics.(19, 20, 21)  
(2) Do laypeople interpret information from regulatory agencies about cost (and lives saved) as being 
exaggerated or understated? This parallels research on whether public ratings of risk magnitude 
match official statistics.(22) 
(3) (How) do people’s preferences for hypothetical regulations change when certainty of cost (or 
benefit) is replaced by a mean-preserving spread of uncertainty? This parallels research on public 
response to uncertainty in risk estimates.(7, 23, 24) 
(4) (How) do preferences change when equal inter-individual distributions of regulatory costs are 
replaced with various unequal distributions, some correlated with income and some not? Just as risks 
are not equally distributed,(25, 26) neither are regulatory costs,(15, 27, 28) so understanding public 
preferences for alternative distributions is important.2  
 The remainder of this article describes the design, instrument, and analytic approaches of 
this research, reports univariate and selected multivariate results, and discusses their implications 




                                                          
1
 See https://sites.google.com/a/adamfinkel.com/nsfprojectoutputs/home for project papers and materials. 
2
 We are unaware of any parallel study that explicitly probes subjects' preferences over, or perceptions of, 
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The online survey instrument presented respondents with a lengthy but methodical walk-
through of the estimation of, reactions to, and value judgments inherent in regulatory costs. 
Excluding various screens with background information or introductions to upcoming questions, 
respondents were asked roughly 40 questions with yes/no, Likert-scale, or single-number answers. 
At the heart of the survey (see Section 2.1.5 below), respondents completed an exercise in which 
they gauged their own beliefs about tradeoffs between social costs and life-saving benefits that they 
deemed wasteful, acceptably expensive, or a “bargain” for society. Respondents were compensated 
for their time (Section 2.3), as the survey was rather involved; the median time to complete it was 38 
minutes. The survey instrument is available on-line (see footnote 1), both as a static .pdf file and as 
an interactive .html file that readers can use to mimic the act of taking the survey if desired. 
2.1.2. Background Information 
 The survey opened with several short narratives emphasizing that tradeoffs are inevitable in 
daily life and public policy, that regulations have benefits (such as greater longevity or visibility) as 
well as costs (such as business costs to install complying technology or worker layoffs), that 
whenever we take individual or collective action to reduce risks to a certain point but no further, we 
have implicitly decided that further costs would exceed further benefits, and that the stopping point 
for life-saving regulation depends in part on the tacit or explicit value we put on avoiding a 
premature death—a  personal judgment that might be informed by considering such things as 
lifetime earnings, jury awards, or how much an individual would pay to avoid a risk.  
 Just before the tradeoff elicitation (Section 2.1.5), all respondents saw a table (freely 
available in a pop-up window throughout the remaining survey) containing five examples of U.S. 
causes of death (from 5 to 125,000 deaths/year), five different examples of public expenditures ($29 
million to $55,000 million annually), and three examples of programs saving lives for widely-varying 
costs (e.g., extrapolating 2010 Chilean miner rescue costs to the U.S. population; annual U.S. heart 
transplants). Respondents were also reminded that the U.S. has roughly 100 million households, that 
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equivalent to about $45,000 per person. These prompts meant that our hypothetical regulatory base 
case (a rule possibly saving 1000 lives nationwide, at a cost of $1 billion—see Sections 2.1.4 and 
2.1.5 below) would be viewed in the context of hazards with both more (Gehrig’s disease, or ALS) 
and fewer (rabies) annual victims, and of programs with annual expenditures both much larger 
(homeland security) and much smaller (air tracking of hurricanes). 
2.1.3. Expected Regulatory Costs 
 The first questions assessed expectations about actual regulatory costs, telling respondents 
that  
 Recently, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) required that  
 by the year 2015, every new car sold in America will have to have a stronger roof. It must  
 be able to withstand a force equal to three times the weight of the car if it rolled over,  
 without crumpling, compared to current cars, whose roofs can withstand a force of 1.5  
 times the weight of the car. More than 10,000 Americans are killed in rollover crashes in 
 a typical year. Taking into account only the cost to strengthen the car roof, how much do  
 you think this regulation will add, averaged over all cars, to the cost of each new car? 
Respondents also were asked to estimate the number of new cars produced in the U.S. each year, 
and the total annual cost of this new regulation.  
2.1.4. Beliefs about Agency Estimates 
 A scenario about a hypothetical USEPA regulation to remove fine particles from outdoor air 
preceded questions about the agency’s estimates of $1 billion in costs and 1000 premature deaths 
prevented per year, respectively. For both costs and lives saved,3 we asked whether people expected 
the true value to be more, less, or the same as the agency’s estimate; if they thought it would differ, 
by how much; and their reasons for thinking that the true value and the agency’s estimate might 
differ (the “surprise paragraph” *Section 2.2+ was an experimental manipulation testing whether 
people would offer different answers if prompted about unexpected outcomes). 
2.1.5. Reactions to Uncertainty in Cost or Benefit Estimates 
                                                          
3
 The instrument used “lives saved” for simplicity, but respondents were explicitly cautioned that this meant 
only that the probability of death from that particular cause was reduced or eliminated, not that a regulation 
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 The limited research on public reactions to institutional uncertainty about risk (7, 23, 24) has not 
been matched with any studies of public reactions to institutional uncertainty about costs, so we 
probed both here by comparing attitudes about hypothetical regulations whose costs or benefits 
were expressed first with certainty and then with varying degrees of uncertainty (always preserving 
the original point estimate as the mean of each permutation with uncertainty). At the outset, we 
needed to ensure that each respondent would face uncertain outcomes meaningfully different for 
her from certainty; for example, the question “how would you feel about buying an ice cream cone 
costing $100, versus one that might cost between $80 and $120?” would likely elicit indifference 
from most people, as would comparing a certain cost of a 2-cent cone versus an uncertain cost 
ranging from 1 to 3 cents. The same could easily happen for hypothetical regulations, depending on 
the respondent’s general views about what balance between cost and benefit is obviously sensible 
or foolish.  Thus we developed personalized uncertainty ranges off of each subject’s own reported 
range where she had a definite preference either for or against a regulation with a given balance of 
risk reduction and cost, as described below. 
 A hypothetical regulation of either an accident or a disease hazard was described either as 
costing $1 billion or as saving 1,000 lives (Section 2.2). The respondent first went through a process 
of iteration to find a value of benefit high enough (or cost low enough) that “you would definitely 
support the regulation.” For example, for a traffic safety regulation estimated to cost $1 billion per 
year, the respondent (in the half-sample randomly given the cost figure and asked to balance it 
against lives saved) might conclude she would definitely support the regulation if it prevented at 
least 2000 deaths per year, but any fewer lives saved would leave her “really unsure whether you 
can justify the regulation to yourself” (Figure 1). Similar iteration would yield a personal estimate of 
how few lives saved would lead her to definitely oppose the regulation, with any intermediate value 
leaving her unsure whether to support or oppose it. A similar but obverse set of judgments made by 
the other half-sample determined the largest amount of regulatory costs in dollars at which each of 
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1,000 premature deaths, and the lowest cost at which he would definitely oppose it. To aid in this 
iteration, a horizontal onscreen slider showed the raw number of dollars or lives being weighed at 
that point, and the implied value of a statistical life (i.e., costs divided by lives, with one such number 
from the instrument scenario and the other from where the respondent currently placed the slider—
Figure 2). In “lives-first” scenarios, where respondents entered dollar figures, the slider also reported 
costs averaged across both U.S. households and per capita. By moving the slider to the left or right, 
the respondent could receive immediate feedback on the implications of a given value, and thus 
perhaps more easily intuit when reaching satisfactory boundary values between acceptable and 
ambiguous, or ambiguous and unacceptable.  
We believe this double-bound method is a significant advance over, or at least 
complementary to, previous methods of eliciting point estimates in stated-preference studies.  
Eliciting single switch-points (i.e., where opposition changes to support, as opposed to our pair of 
bounds at which either opposition or support changes to indeterminacy) is common in the stated-
preferences field for estimating willingness-to-pay for non-market goods or the value of a statistical 
life. But this strategy can be inferior to the double-bound method, as it can be difficult for people to 
confidently select a precise point where this switch between acceptability and unacceptability 
occurs, and preference reversals can occur.(29, 30) 
Insert Figures 1 & 2 about here 
Once these personal bounds on acceptable and unacceptable tradeoffs had been specified, 
subsequent questions introduced uncertainty. The manipulation involved three steps and two 
uncertainty ranges, described here for the “costs-first” condition (see Figure 1). First, a respondent 
was asked to rate her likelihood of support for a regulation that would entail definite regulatory 
costs of $1 billion to save the precisely-known number of lives computed as the arithmetic mean M 
of her two self-generated bounds. For example, if her bounds were 100 lives and 240 lives, we would 
ask about her support (on a scale of 1 = very unlikely, 4 = completely unsure, 7 = very likely) for a 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
9 
her bounds—or an imputed value of life of roughly $5.9 million. Next, she saw an uncertain agency 
estimate (“wide”) that challenged her to consider the rule as one she could clearly oppose or clearly 
support, but still preserving the original mean. In this permutation, she was told there was a uniform 
probability4 that the number of lives saved is between 0.6*L and H+(0.4*L)—thus, for the 
hypothetical bounds above, the “wide” uncertainty range is 60-280 lives saved (i.e., a change of 110 
lives both above and below her mean of 170). The likelihood-of-support question was repeated for 
the wide range, followed by a direct question on whether she would support the regulation more 
given certainty versus wide uncertainty, with numerical response options personalized to the 
respondent’s own bounds (e.g., “1 = I support much more the regulation when its estimated benefit 
is an uncertain number of lives between 60 and 280; 7 = I support much more the regulation when its 
benefit is definitely 170 lives saved”). Third, a “narrow” range of uncertainty was constructed based 
on M ± [(H-L)/4], a range entirely within the respondent’s “ambiguous” range;5 using the same 
example, “narrow” uncertainty would involve between 135 and 205 lives saved, still with a mean of 
170 lives. A likelihood-of-support question was again followed by a question on whether she would 
support the regulation more given certainty or narrow uncertainty.6  
2.1.6. Reactions to Differing Scenarios of Inter-individual Variability in Regulatory Cost 
 Presenting a hypothetical traffic safety regulation that would definitely save 1000 lives a 
year at a cost of $5 billion, we explained that the roughly 100 million U.S. households would thus 
                                                          
4
 The specific wording was “any number in this range has an equal chance of being the true number” of dollars 
or deaths prevented; “*t+he two endpoints of the range are no more or less likely to be the true value than any 
other number within the range.” We did not probe whether respondents understood uniform probability, and 
findings (end of Section 3.5.1) imply many respondents either did not, or understood but questioned the 
assumption’s validity. 
5
 This value (with M = (H+L)/2) must be within the ambiguous range because (3/4 H + ¼ L) must be < H because 
L < H, while (3/4  L + ¼ H) must be > L, because H > L. 
6
 The lives-first version was similar but reversed: a respondent would rate her likelihood of support for (1) a 
regulation that would save 1,000 lives at the mean M of her two self-generated bounds, which we computed 
for her as L [low cost, definitely support] + H [high cost, definitely oppose])/2 (e.g., $3 billion if her bounds 
were $1 billion and $5 billion, or an imputed value of life of $3 million); (2) the same regulation with a “wide” 
uncertain agency estimate with a uniform probability that the cost is between 0.6*L and H+(0.4*L)] (for this 
hypothetical case, $600 million to $5.4 billion, or an equal change of $2.4 billion above and below her mean); 
and (3) the same regulation with a “narrow” range of uncertainty based on M ± *(H-L)/4] (in this case, from $2 
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each pay about $50 if the regulatory costs were equally distributed, but that the agency did not 
know how those costs would actually be distributed across society. We asked how likely the 
respondent would be to support the regulation if costs were distributed equally, or in various 
unequal distributions allocated randomly or by income (Section 3.6). To assess whether expectations 
for personal regulatory costs would affect judgments about fairness, we also asked whether the 
respondent would expect his own household to pay more, less, or the same as the $10 average of $1 
billion in total regulation-induced price increases for “something that virtually everyone buys, such 
as gasoline or electricity,” and whether he thought this outcome fair. This set of questions ended 
with three general questions about attitudes towards distributions of regulatory costs.  
2.1.7. General Attitudes and Demographics 
 Attitudes probed included those towards government uncertainty about regulatory impacts; 
government regulation of personal conduct and of externalities imposed by industrial activity; and 
use of numbers (five items from an eight-item measure of subjective numeracy(31)). A validated 
measure of objective numeracy was available, from a prior study, for 83% of the sample; it assessed 
respondents’ ability to cope with probabilities, in frequency and percentage terms, scored as the 
number of correct answers (0-11).(32) Respondents supplied demographic information including 
gender, age, education, ethnicity, political party, political ideology, home ownership, job status, and 
income.  
2.2. Experimental Design 
The instrument came in 16 variants (2 X 2 X 2 X 2 design). The aim of the four randomly-
assigned manipulations was to test the effects of: (1) varying the hazard subject to potential 
regulation (acute injury or chronic disease); (2) varying whether participants were asked to consider 
the size of benefits justifying a fixed regulatory cost, or the size of regulatory cost justifying fixed 
benefits; (3) providing or omitting information on upward and downward biases in various types of 
cost estimates in common use; and (4) providing or omitting information on the value of a statistical 
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First, the hypothetical regulation being considered with and without uncertainty in cost or 
benefit (see Section 2.1.5 above) would either reduce deaths from traffic accidents (proposed by 
NHTSA) or a carcinogen in drinking water (proposed by USEPA), testing the effect of acute versus 
chronic mortality. 
Second, preferred tradeoffs between regulatory costs and benefits might vary by which side 
of the ledger is considered first (see Section 2.1.5). This framing effect might invoke anchoring(33) due 
to the differential magnitude of regulatory impacts: billions of dollars (possible for the  estimated 
costs of a major U. S. regulation) or thousands of lives (the maximal magnitude of health and safety 
benefits, in lives saved, for most regulations). Alternatively, any framing effect could be due to 
thoughts elicited by being “given” either money or a life-saving opportunity and asked to trade for it.  
Third, respondents either did or did not read the following paragraph about "surprise" In the 
costs of regulation before answering questions about the accuracy of agency estimates:  
It can sometimes be hard to know what something will cost before we produce it. Sometimes we 
think a highway tunnel can be built under a city for $5 billion, but it ends up costing far more. Other 
times, we overestimate cost, as when technology becomes much cheaper as it improves; think of 
smart phone or plasma TV prices this year versus 5 years ago. Like future construction or technology 
costs, surprises in either direction (higher or lower actual numbers) can occur for estimates of 
regulatory costs. The same can be said of regulatory benefits; for example, many scientists now think 
the artificial sweetener saccharin does not cause cancer in humans as previously assumed. On the 
other hand, concern is rising about possible health effects of (currently unregulated) exposures to 
electromagnetic fields from power lines and cellphones. 
 
This manipulation allowed us to see whether people had a confirmation bias for agency inaccuracy 
or uncertainty in estimates of regulatory costs and benefits, by prompting some respondents but not 
others to consider overruns or “underruns.” We did not test for order effects (e.g., if surprises in 
benefit estimates versus cost estimates, or in cost savings versus overruns, were cited first).  
Fourth, after reading about general issues in value-of-statistical-life (VSL) estimation and just 
before questions on hypothetical costs/lives tradeoffs, half of the sample read this sentence 
reporting the average and range of most federal VSL estimates:  
Based on such studies [of earnings, jury awards, willingness-to-pay surveys, etc.], U.S. Federal 
agencies have calculated the value of saving a single (unidentified) human life as between $0.6 million 
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This manipulation allowed us to determine whether a numerical anchor might affect respondents’ 
considerations of appropriate cost/lives tradeoffs.  
 Randomization yielded relatively balanced sub-samples across these experimental 
manipulations, as 160 (21.5%) read the NHTSA lives-first and 206 (27.7%) the NHTSA cost-first 
versions; 183 (24.6%) read the EPA lives-first and 195 (26.2%) the EPA cost-first versions. Some 375 
(50.4%) saw the Surprise paragraph, while 390 (52.4%) saw the VSL sentence. ANOVA revealed no 
differences across the four contrasts in gender, age, income, education, full-time employment, home 
ownership, political partisanship or ideology; statistically significant but substantively minor 
differences occurred in subjective and probabilistic numeracy, and white ethnicity (see first author 
for details).  
2.3. Sample 
An invitation to participate in the study was issued to the then-1,498 members of the 
Decision Research (DR) online panel, a diverse, quota-recruited (gender, age, education) sample of 
American adults, most with job and/or family responsibilities. Their responses in NSF-funded studies 
on other topics (e.g., the 2008 financial crisis(34)) resembled those of representative samples. A 
payment of ten dollars was offered due to the expected difficulty of some questions, supplemented 
by a lottery (weighted by early response) for twenty $100 gift cards. After data collection slowed, an 
incentive of $100 for the 750th respondent was added. Data collection occurred over June and July 
of 2012.  
2.4. Analyses 
We report here descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliability analyses. As noted in 
Section 3.7, we also ran multivariate analyses (generalized linear models; logistic regressions; 
multinomial logistic regressions) to explore whether any of our experimental manipulations or 
several other factors (e.g., demographics; beliefs about need for regulation; beliefs and attitudes 
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3). All multivariate results, and descriptions of the methods, appear on the project website (see 
footnote 1).  
3. RESULTS 
 In Section 3 we discuss in turn 1) characteristics of the respondents; 2) descriptive statistics 
for numeracy and regulatory attitudes (some of which feature as significant multivariate 
independent variables in Section 3.7); 3) descriptive statistics regarding our four research questions; 
and 4) a summary—and selected specific results—of multivariate analyses.  
3.1. Respondents 
Our 796 responses (53% of panelists contacted) were trimmed to 744 after deleting 
respondents who did not use the slider (19 people), reversed slider answers (e.g., giving high bounds 
with low bounds requested—17 people), answered too quickly or too slowly (7), gave the same 
answers (6) or similar options (e.g., all “a” in multiple choice—2) multiple times, or had substantial 
missing data (1). 
The resulting sample was slightly more female, more educated and higher-income, and 
about the same ethnicity, as the U.S. population. Respondents were 45% male and 78% white, with a 
mean age of 43 (SD = 13). Some 42% were college graduates, with a modal income category (among 
ten) of $50-74,000 (23%), and 20% at $100,000-plus. The sample included 34% Democrats and 21% 
Republicans, and 35% liberals and 31% conservatives. Some 54% were fully employed,7 and 66% 
were house owners.  
3.2. Descriptive Statistics for Numeracy and Regulatory Attitudes 
 The measure of objective probabilistic numeracy (n = 619) had a mean of 7.91 on the 12-
point scale (SD = 2.36). Subjective numeracy (n = 714) had a mean value of 21.78 (SD = 4.96), in a 
potential range of 5 to 30, and correlated modestly with probabilistic numeracy (+.38, p < .001).  
                                                          
7
 In the summer of 2012, shortly before this survey, non-seasonally-adjusted employment of more than 30 
hours per week in the U.S. was a bit more than 44% of all adults (see 
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Four questions with a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) response format assessed 
attitudes about government regulation overall: (1) the need for the private sector to be regulated to 
protect public health and safety (51.5% agreed or strongly agreed; these two response categories 
define “agreed” in the rest of this paper), (2) the general ineffectiveness of such regulation to 
actually protect health and safety (38.5% agreed), (3) the appropriateness of regulation of private 
individual behaviors, such as marijuana smoking, abortion, handgun ownership, and spanking one’s 
children (34.5% agreed), and (4) whether regulation of behavior in one’s home or with one’s body 
constitutes government “meddling” (14.1% agreed). Factor analysis found no single factor included 
all four, and reliability analysis found consistency among these items was very low, so in multivariate 
analyses the first item only was used as a predictor. 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics on Beliefs about Regulatory Costs 
 The median estimate of the cost to double the impact that a new car’s roof could resist was 
$950 (90th percentile confidence interval: $50-$6,000), a gross over-estimate compared to NHTSA’s 
estimate of $54 per car.8 Estimates of new cars sold in the U.S. per year, however, were too low, a 
median of 2 million (90th CI: 30,000-20 million), versus the true figure of about 10 million.  
3.4. Descriptive Statistics on Beliefs about Agency Estimates of Regulatory Impacts 
Given hypothetical EPA estimates that it would cost $1 billion to regulate fine particles of 
soot, and that in so doing 1,000 lives would be saved, respondents generally regarded lives-saved as 
more likely for EPA to estimate accurately than costs (Table I, top), which they generally thought EPA 
would underestimate. Overall (Table I, bottom), the most common response pair was to believe that 
EPA was accurate on both costs and lives, followed closely by belief that the agency was accurate on 
lives but underestimated costs. Systematic “pro-regulation” bias by the agency (under-estimation of 
                                                          
8
 Retrospective analyses of this regulation’s true cost are yet to be done; the rule only became effective in late 
2013 (pers. comm. with NHTSA staff, Sept. 2013). Agency contractors found the technology of wider roof 
struts already becoming available on some car models with no change in price; although that is not the same 
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cost and over-estimation of lives saved) was deemed roughly three times more likely than an “anti-
regulation” bias (over-estimation of cost and under-estimation of lives).  
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
Those who suggested that the agency would misestimate costs and/or lives saved were 
asked for their rationales in an open-ended question that allowed for multiple answers per 
respondent. Table II shows a diverse and often-sophisticated set of explanations from this well-
educated sample. Both quotations in the table and estimate-specific rationales (e.g., expecting that 
reducing pollution will reduce non-lethal impacts as well, labeled by the authors as “morbidity co-
benefits”) reflect the actual complexity of responses rather than authors’ categorization. 
Explanations were dominated by very general expectations of government error among those 
expecting cost under-estimation, based on stereotypes or extrapolation from predicted costs of 
projects directly funded by government (i.e., not estimates by government of others’ costs) or even 
personal experience with contractors. This differs from expectations for surprise or deliberate 
under-counting, also common among those expecting cost under-estimation. Estimate-specific 
explanations were relatively rare, dominated by technological innovation (cost over-estimation), the 
difficulty of removing soot from the air and omitted costs (cost under-estimation), competing 
mortality causes (lives over-estimation), and under-estimation of air quality as a cause of mortality 
(lives under-estimation). 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
Near the end of the survey, after respondents answered questions about trade-offs, we 
returned to the theme of agency accuracy and presented a hypothetical EPA regulation that the 
agency estimated would cost between $1 billion and $3 billion (thus the agency announced a range 
of estimates rather than a point estimate, as in the earlier question). A plurality thought the true 
cost would be between $2 and $3 billion (41%), followed by more than $3 billion (33.1%; i.e., belief 
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agency cost over-estimation). Thus cost under-estimation was expected for a range as well as for a 
point estimate. 
Finally, we asked respondents to evaluate a government agency statement that it “doesn’t 
know with a high degree of certainty how much the regulation will cost.” Some 41% (Table III, top) 
thought this statement connoted honesty, a moderate plurality were neutral on whether it signaled 
incompetence or trustworthiness, while almost two-thirds each thought agency uncertainty was due 
to the inherent difficulty of cost estimation and that such an agency would be uncertain on 
regulatory benefits as well. Competence (incompetence reverse coded), honesty, trust and inherent 
difficulty formed a weakly reliable index of positive views of agency uncertainty about costs (α = 
.68).9 For multivariate analyses we used a two-item honesty-trust index with the greatest reliability 
(α = .76). 
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
3.5. Descriptive Statistics on Attitudes toward Certain versus Uncertain Estimates of Regulatory 
Costs and Benefits 
“Narrow” uncertainty in government estimates of the costs or benefits of a specific 
regulation was at least as acceptable as certainty, and even “wide” uncertainty was acceptable to 
many, when uncertainties were computed as functions of one’s personal tradeoffs just elicited. 
Presented with a regulation whose cost (or benefit) was known to fall exactly at the arithmetic mean 
of each respondent’s high and low bounds, 66.4% of the entire sample (i.e., without distinguishing 
those who saw cost versus lives anchors) were likely to support it, with 12.3% unlikely (the rest were 
neutral). Given narrow uncertainty, 61.9% were likely and 11.4% unlikely to support the regulation. 
Asked about their relative support for the same regulation with these different levels of uncertainty, 
35.9% tended to more support for the certain estimate, while 40.2% tended to more support for the 
narrowly uncertain estimate. Given wide uncertainty in an agency estimate, 52.3% of respondents 
                                                          
9
 Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of consistency between items in an index, with values closer to 1.00 indicating 
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were likely and 19.5% unlikely to support the regulation. In this case, relative support was 47.8% for 
the certain estimate, and 34.3% for wide uncertainty. So, looking just at the total proportion 
expressing support for the regulation, the plurality decreased from 66% under certainty, to 62% 
under narrow uncertainty, to 52% under wide uncertainty—indicating some discomfort with 
increasing (mean-preserving) uncertainty, but still with many respondents whose support was 
unaffected even by wide uncertainty. 
Given the relative inattention in federal cost-benefit analyses to uncertainty in costs,(2) we 
focused on responses of those exposed to the lives-first anchor, who thus would be responding to 
uncertainty bounds expressed in dollars. Proportions did not substantially differ from those reported 
above: 65% support to 13% opposition on certain estimates, 61% to 15% on narrow uncertainty, 
46% to 23% on wide uncertainty; 46% preferring the certain estimate to 41% preferring the narrow 
uncertainty estimate, 47% certain versus 35% wide. Using t tests for independent samples, support 
for the regulation with a widely uncertain estimate was significantly lower for the lives-first group (M 
= 4.33, SD = 1.54), dealing with uncertainty in costs, than for the costs-first group (M = 4.73, SD = 
1.51; p < .001), dealing with uncertainty in lives. Thus distaste for wide uncertainty in costs was 
greater than for wide uncertainty in lives saved, but this disparity did not occur for either narrow 
uncertainty or for certainty, as no other differences were statistically significant. 
The last two paragraphs discussed subjects whose support diminished with increasing 
uncertainty.  Also of interest is the extent to which uncertainty matters—that is, what proportion of 
subjects changed their views in either direction when point estimates of cost or benefit were 
replaced by mean-preserving spreads of uncertainty?  One rationalization for not estimating or 
reporting uncertainty(2) holds that laypeople care about expected consequences, not their possible 
spread.  Measuring “affected by uncertainty” as a change of at least 2 units in the subject’s Likert 
score of support/opposition, 23% of respondents were affected by wide uncertainty, while 48% 
offered the same rating for both certainty and wide uncertainty.  So roughly one-quarter of this 
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the proportion of subjects whose score changed by 2 or more units was greater among those 
confronted with cost uncertainty rather than lives-saved uncertainty (25% versus 20%).  This finding 
suggests that the side of the cost-benefit ledger where uncertainty is less routinely explored(2) is in 
fact the more influential of the two types of uncertainty on public attitudes. 
Asked later why they had preferred wide uncertainty to certainty, and given two choices 
plus an open-ended “any other” elaboration, 140 respondents thought the “support” end of the 
range was more likely (an optimistic stance); 133 selected “I thought seizing the possible opportunity 
to save lives cheaply was more important than worrying about the regulation perhaps being a bad 
deal” (risk seeking for gains). Focusing just on the lives-first group dealing with uncertainty regarding 
costs, 57% had chosen the risk seeking explanation for preferring wide uncertainty to certainty, 
while in the costs-first condition only 41% chose that option. Thus being honest about cost 
uncertainties may garner support from those more motivated by the cost distribution’s left-hand tail 
(to save lives cheaply) than by its right-hand tail (saving lives at undue expense). 
3.6. Descriptive Statistics of Preferences for Distribution of Regulatory Costs 
Respondents were next asked to assume that a hypothetical intervention with a certainty of 
$5 billion in associated regulatory costs, distributed across 100 million U.S. households, would 
prevent 1000 traffic accident deaths per year. Attitudes toward these distributions were assessed on 
the same likelihood-of-support scale (1 = very unlikely, 4 = completely unsure, 7 = very likely) used in 
the previous section. When subjects were told that the costs would be equally distributed across all 
U.S. households ($50 each), 58.6% favored a regulation with this distribution, while 25.3% opposed 
it. With a random, and somewhat unequal, distribution of costs —1% pay $500, 90% pay $50, and 
9% of households pay nothing—support and opposition were 37% and 45%, respectively, with 
support dropping considerably and opposition going up considerably relative to equal distribution. 
With a random, and quite unequal, distribution of costs —1% pay $10,000, 1% receive $5,000 (a 
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opposition were 31% and 48%, respectively (thus further deterioration of support as inequality 
increases, but not proportionately to the change in inequality).  
A separate trio of preferences was produced by comparing the somewhat-unequal 
distribution responses when those burdens were assumed to be dependent on income rather than 
random. If the 1% richest households paid $500 in regulatory costs, 90% paid $50, and the poorest 
9% paid zero, 66% favored this distribution, 21% opposed it, a more favorable response to this 
progressive allocation than to the same distribution allocated randomly. Reversing this distribution 
(1% poorest paid $500, 90% paid $50, richest 9% zero), proportions were 19% and 73%, respectively; 
thus, the regressive distribution elicited substantial opposition.  
To explore whether these preferences were at least in part self-interested, we asked how 
much of a total regulatory cost increase of $1 billion in “something that virtually everyone buys, such 
as gasoline or electricity,” the respondent would expect his or her household to pay. Of three 
possible answers, the majority (60.8%) thought they would pay an equal share of $10, 14% expected 
to pay less, and 25.4% expected to pay more. When asked whether the share expected by each 
individual was part of a fair distribution, 58.2% agreed and 21.3% disagreed . The two items 
correlated weakly (r = .15, p < .001); while those expecting to pay less than or their share tended to 
report this as fair, those expecting to pay more than their share exhibited a symmetric distribution 
around the middle value of “neither fair nor unfair.”  
Finally, we asked about general beliefs about the distribution of regulatory costs (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The bottom section of Table III shows that about a third each 
agreed or disagreed that the long-run collective impact of regulations would average out to be about 
the same for “every business or customer.” About 43% agreed that an unequal distribution of 
regulatory costs would be ethical only if those who paid more also received more benefits, while 
27% disagreed.  
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 Previous trail-blazing studies in risk perception—e.g., how the lay public processes 
information about the toxicity of and exposures to hazardous chemicals (3-4)—have provided only 
descriptive statistics. We also emphasize these, but must go a bit further given that we incorporated 
experimental manipulations and conducted multivariate analyses that also included both 
demographic characteristics and regulatory-cost beliefs and attitudes as independent variables. We 
do not go into much detail here, as the results overall offered limited explanatory value, but all 
multivariate analyses can be obtained at the website identified in note 1. 
 Caution is warranted in interpretation of these multivariate analyses: e.g., linear regression 
analyses (adjusted for the number of experimental and non-experimental independent variables) 
explained between 0% and 23% of the variance in thirteen dependent variables; for nine logistic 
regressions, the model correctly predicted between 56% and 86% of the cases, with the prediction 
less than the proportional by-chance accuracy rate (see Table IV for definition) for two dependent 
variables. The four experimental manipulations (see Section 2.2) had relatively few statistically 
significant effects and in no discernible pattern. Of 22 dependent variables subjected to multivariate 
analysis, only five were significantly associated with a total of six main experimental effects, while 
seven were significantly associated with a total of 14 interaction effects, which were even harder to 
interpret.10  
 We report here on multivariate analyses of five dependent variables, which we chose in 
order to illustrate across our four research questions some topics for which the effects, if any, of 
demographic and other potential predictors should be of most interest to practitioners of cost-
benefit analysis and regulation (see Table IV).  
                                                          
10
 For example, Table IV shows interaction effects involving the Anchor and Agency manipulations for beliefs 
about regulatory costs and agency estimates of regulatory impacts, even though these manipulations followed 
rather than preceded those questions. Probably an unmeasured attribute of the sub-samples in these 
manipulations affected their responses, but the same is possible for attitudes toward uncertainty and 
regulatory cost distributions (which followed these manipulations); one must be cautious about interpreting 
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 First, people who were more probabilistically numerate and non-white were more accurate 
in estimating regulatory costs than others, potentially an important issue for regulatory education 
and informed citizen participation in policymaking.11 
 The next two examples concern two contrasts of beliefs about agency over-estimation 
versus under-estimation, of costs and lives respectively, as these are important for the credibility of 
agencies’ regulatory-impact estimates. People who expected to pay more than their share of 
regulatory costs and felt this was unfair, and those who had full-time jobs, were more likely to 
believe in EPA under-estimation of costs than in over-estimation. Those who were more politically 
liberal, less numerate, and less likely to see their share of regulatory costs as unfair were more likely 
to believe in under-estimation of lives saved than in over-estimation. Belief in under-estimation of 
lives also was associated with a three-way interaction of the experimental manipulations. 
 Fourth, given the general lack of public information on uncertainty in regulatory impact 
estimates, particularly on the cost side of the ledger, it is important to understand how people might 
react to such information. People who felt agencies tended to under-estimate costs rather than 
over-estimate or accurately estimate costs, and those who were more probabilistically numerate, 
were more likely to be among those (n = 227) exhibiting an ordered preference for impact estimates 
that are certain (their absolute support for a regulation with certainty > narrow uncertainty > wide 
uncertainty), compared with those exhibiting the reverse ordered preference (n = 77).  
 Fifth, understanding public preferences for distributions of regulatory costs is important, 
given the likely mismatch between a citizen's logical assumption (in the absence of explicit 
distributional information) that costs are distributed equally across the population and the likely 
skewed distributions of actual regulatory cost. People inclined to think that agency admission of 
                                                          
11
 One two-way and two three-way interactions of experimental manipulations also were significant. For 
brevity, only one three-way interaction is described here (and we omit details of other experimental 
interactions in Table IV, which can be obtained from the website cited in the first footnote). When the surprise 
paragraph was present, the presence or absence of the VSL sentence made no difference, but without the 
surprise paragraph, ratios (subjects’ estimated costs divided by the true cost) for people seeing the VSL 
sentence were a quarter the size (though still over-estimates) of ratios for those not seeing that sentence.  We 
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uncertainty in costs indicates the agency is honest and trustworthy, and those who were exposed to 
the carcinogen regulation rather than the traffic safety regulation, were more likely than others to 
support a regulation with equal distribution of costs than to support a skewed cost distribution 
uncorrelated with income.12 
 Of these five examples, the linear regression analysis attempting to explain the accuracy of 
respondents’ estimate of a specific regulatory cost did very poorly, explaining at most 10% of the 
variance in this accuracy. The four multinomial logistic regression analyses did better, with all 
exceeding (if often not by much) the proportional by-chance accuracy rate. 
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
4. DISCUSSION 
  Table V summarizes some of our major findings and our interpretations of how they might 
affect practice among regulatory impact analysts or regulatory agencies (Sections 4.1-4.4). We then 
expound further on the relationship between these findings on “cost perception” and prior findings 
of risk perception research, and outline some limitations of this pilot study. 
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE 
4.1. Beliefs about Regulatory Costs 
 Our findings of lay over-estimation of the unit costs of regulation, and under-estimation of 
total production, must be tested further to see if they generalize to other regulated goods and 
services beyond the traffic-safety case examined here. If these findings about both the direction and 
magnitude of these lay misestimates of the cost of control technology hold up, this implies that 
people might not believe problems can be solved as cheaply as the estimated cost figures from 
agencies suggest, despite the literature indicating these are over-estimates in most cases.(35, 36, 37) 
Hence citizens might suspect agencies of cost under-estimation not on general principle but due to 
misunderstandings about technology costs.  
                                                          
12
 An equivalent multinomial logistic regression on wealth-based distribution of regulatory costs could not be 
estimated reliably, as only 17 people in the regression analysis supported larger payments from the poor 
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Two questions long of interest to risk perception scholars—what do people know about 
risks, and what should they know?—should be raised about regulatory costs as well. Research on the 
role of “facts” in risk judgments,(38) “intuitive toxicology,”(3) exposure beliefs,(4) or mental models of 
hazard evolution(39) has generally concluded that knowledge is seldom a dominant factor in risk 
perception, and yet risk practitioners seem to regard factual education of “the public” as essential in 
a democracy. Our study of regulatory-cost knowledge is one of very few attempts to study how 
people think about how risk is managed, as opposed to how large it is or how likely it is to occur (risk 
assessment), so our findings on regulatory-cost knowledge might help spur a useful expansion of risk 
perception research. Further experiments could test whether and how judgments of agency 
accuracy change—and lead to changes, if any, in citizens’ participation in policy deliberations—when 
people are told the estimated cost of a proposed regulation, the independent retrospective estimate 
of an implemented regulation’s actual cost, or the general finding that agency estimates tend to be 
biased high (and why).  
4.2. Beliefs about Agency Estimates of Regulatory Costs 
 Expectations of agency-estimated impacts of regulations were not symmetrical (Table I), 
with costs deemed subject to inaccurate estimates—the majority view—more often than lives 
saved, for which the majority expectation was agency accuracy. This difference raises questions that 
have not received attention before about the judged equivalence of estimating costs versus lives 
saved. For example, do laypeople, as a reviewer suggested, expect agencies promulgating health and 
safety regulations to be good at estimating risk reductions as their core mission, whereas estimating 
costs is not (and thus perhaps reverse these ratings for an agency like the Department of Treasury)? 
Or do people expect more uncertainty from economic forecasts than from biological/physical 
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Given few studies of public or advocates’ beliefs and attitudes about risk assessment,(41, 42, 43) public 
perceptions of risk and cost estimation methods are topics ripe for more research.13  
 Our findings of differing responses to two kinds of hypothetical EPA cost estimates (costs 
expressed as a point estimate versus a range) imply that point estimates arouse skepticism that 
relatively narrow ranges of estimates might not. However, the qualitative response to an agency 
admitting its uncertainty about regulatory costs was mixed, likely to a large degree reflecting general 
distrust in government (which we did not measure). Prior research found citizens interpret an 
institution’s statement of a range of risk estimates, versus a point (certain) estimate, in widely 
divergent ways regarding its honesty or competence, and that they tend to assume that uncertainty 
in risk assessment reflects self-interest or incompetence rather than the task’s inherent difficulty.(7, 
23-24, 44) Our finding that the sample as a whole was willing to believe EPA under-estimates costs but is 
accurate in estimating lives saved by a proposed regulation implies finer distinctions than “good” 
versus “bad” performance, reminiscent of the finding that trust in different actors can vary by the 
performance criterion used (e.g., keeping costs low versus protecting public health).(45, 46, 47) 
4.3. Attitudes toward Certain versus Uncertain Estimates of Regulatory Costs 
 Although in general a certain estimate was preferred to any uncertain one, narrowly 
uncertain estimates received about as much support as certain ones (although less so when the 
respondent was seeing uncertainty in terms of regulatory costs rather than regulatory life-saving 
benefits). Even a regulation with widely uncertain impact estimates received surprisingly strong 
support, although less absolute support (from about half the sample, rather than from about two-
thirds) than for either narrowly uncertain or certain estimates, and less absolute support when the 
wide uncertainty concerned regulatory costs rather than regulatory benefits. When support was 
directly compared, about half the sample favored the regulation with the certain estimate of 
                                                          
13
 An issue more germane to imputing values of a statistical life (VSLs) using lay preferences for national-level 
tradeoffs (Ref. 18) is whether people’s expectations for regulatory cost under-estimation mean that imputed 
VSLs may be biased low (e.g., if people see “$1 billion to save 1000 lives” tradeoffs, and they process the 
information as “really $2 billion to save these lives,” they will “require” more lives saved (a lower VSL) to 
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regulatory impacts, but a full third favored the regulation with the widely uncertain estimates.14 If 
cost-benefit analysts avoid quantifying the uncertainty in their estimates of either side of the 
regulatory-impacts ledger partly due to supposed widespread public distaste for uncertainty, our 
findings undercut that reasoning.15  
4.4. Preferences for Distribution of Regulatory Costs  
 Our sample generally preferred an equal distribution of regulatory costs to random or 
income-based unequal distributions. Agencies currently do little to collect or report information on 
the distribution of regulatory costs,(48) and agencies might be conflicted about revealing the often-
unequal distribution of costs given this egalitarian preference. A similar caveat might be raised about 
communicating the distribution of risks, despite the lack of research to date on public expectations 
for that distribution (footnote 2). More general beliefs and attitudes—e.g., whether short-run 
imbalances in regulatory-cost distribution disappear over time; whether those who pay also must be 
the beneficiaries for regulatory impacts to be fair—vary widely (Table III), so debates over actual 
regulatory cost distributions are not likely to disappear with more information.  
People tend to be more concerned about those risks to which they are likely to be more 
exposed or vulnerable,(49,50) and in public health, where social vulnerabilities are increasingly 
integrated into assessments of health disparities,(51, 52) objective distributions of risks are of great 
interest. Probing how people think both risks and regulatory costs are or should be distributed by 
income, race, the geographic area of the nation or locality, or economic sectors would fill important 
gaps in the literature. Knowing in advance citizens’ beliefs and attitudes about distribution would 
                                                          
14
 We should caution that, in contrast to the personally-meaningful uncertainties we generated, official 
estimates of the impacts of actual regulations might prompt a citizen observer to: (1) indifference, because the 
range of uncertainty falls entirely within estimated impact ranges where respondents automatically support or 
oppose the regulation, or cannot care about those levels (see Section 2.1.5); (2) support, because of general 
belief in the need for regulation, general trust in government, or belief that expression of uncertainty is honest 
and trustworthy; or (3) outrage, because competence is believed to imply certainty about regulatory impacts, 
or due to general distrust of regulations or of government. 
15
 As a reviewer noted, other reasons for agency reluctance to present uncertainty (e.g., interest groups or the 
media publicizing one end of a range as the central or only estimate, to further their policy goals) are not 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
26 
help agencies avoid disbelief or other negative reactions to their publicity about actual cost (or risk) 
distributions. 
4.5. Interpretations of Risk, Benefit, and Cost 
 In this section we comment briefly on potential parallels and synergies between the 
decades-long history of research on “risk perception” (better termed “risk interpretation”(53) to avoid 
presumptions that one viewpoint is correct), and the field of “regulatory cost interpretation” we 
inaugurate with this study.  
 Both risk interpretation and regulatory cost interpretation plausibly involve experts and 
laypeople working “at the limits of their expertise,” with policy debates affected more by trust, 
emotion, gender and worldviews than by topical literacy and education.(54) Just as those laypeople 
more knowledgeable about a given technological risk may often be those most opposed to the 
technology,(38) the same could be true with regard to regulatory costs. Our multivariate results 
suggested no statistically significant effect of gender (see website, cited in footnote 1), and we did 
not test other such factors (e.g., do some costs seem “dreaded”?(55) does anger about costs fuel 
aggressive reaction, and fear about costs deferential reaction, to agencies responsible for the 
regulation?(56)), but assessing parallel explanations of risk and cost interpretations is warranted. 
 When it comes to comparing public reactions to regulatory costs and to risks, the 
possibilities are intriguing. For example, we appreciate a reviewer noting that people are exposed 
throughout their lives to information that helps calibrate their understanding of the relative 
prominence of dangers or causes of death (e.g., we learn of the age and cause of death for family, 
friends, or celebrities), even if such feedback is far from perfect, illustrated by the finding that 
people tend to over-estimate probabilities of rare causes of death and under-estimate probabilities 
of common causes of death.(57) In contrast, people have few opportunities to calibrate the costs 
(regulatory or otherwise) of managing risks. Even for personal risks, we may have information mainly 
on the costs entailed by direct personal expenses of (say) insurance, a car with a higher safety rating, 
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actions (e.g., reduced future wealth due to present risk management choices(58)) or to others, and 
the costs of social regulation are much more opaque. Information on the incidence of regulatory 
costs is limited to some publicity about industries’ compliance costs (which may or may not be 
passed on to consumers), and media fascination with arguably overwrought claims about “job-killing 
regulations.”(59)  
 In contrast to the asymmetry of information across the benefit/cost ledger, we see an 
unappreciated parallel as well.  If costs are already in the proper units to be compared to monetized 
benefits as a basis (or, alternatively, a rationale) for regulatory decisions, one might ask why one 
should study how people interpret something as seemingly natural as money? But the risk 
interpretation field arose(60) because observations showed that: (1) people, including experts, can be 
misinformed about the magnitude of risks, their uncertainties, and their distributions; and (2) people 
are entitled to complex, affect-rich, nonlinear, and idiosyncratic views of risk appropriate to their 
respective situations, not merely to expert-imposed interpretations. We assert that the same is true 
for costs on both counts (in particular, that CBA needs to rethink its inattention to the well-known 
phenomenon of the diminishing marginal utility of money(17)), and that understanding of risk 
management at the macro (e.g., national or societal) and micro (e.g., individual or household) levels 
can be enhanced if costs as well as risks and benefits are carefully estimated and given thoughtful 
values in terms and units of welfare, rather than longevity or money per se.(61) This is not to say that 
risks and costs are conceptually similar, or should be assessed in similar ways, only that issues of 
uncertainty,(1,2) inter-individual variability,(15) non-linearity of their respective impacts as a function of 
their size,(17) and inter-individual differences in perception and affect surround both costs and risks, 
and must be addressed on both sides of the ledger. 
A long-standing but infrequently applied practice in risk analysis of considering costs, 
benefits and risks simultaneously,(62, 63, 64) to which our study contributes, might inspire a more 
systematic approach to such a synthesis. However, on those few occasions when judged benefits 
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or how their interpretations affect a third variable, such as trust,(66) rather than the focus here on 
plausible national-level decisions and numbers (e.g., willingness to collectively pay $1 billion in 
regulatory costs to save 1,000 lives). McDaniels(67) found a strong congruence between lay 
willingness to pay for a reduction in population risk and the actual or proposed costs for regulations 
of similar hazards. Mendeloff and Kaplan(68) at a similarly early date assessed lay valuation of specific 
risk reductions relative to other risk reduction programs, avoiding the cognitive effort or 
inconsistencies that they thought might have accompanied questions about optimal budgets or risks, 
or about the absolute value of preventing these deaths. 
Joint consideration of risk interpretation and the study of regulatory cost interpretation 
introduced in this article might yield a field of “regulatory choice interpretation,” shedding light on 
such issues as how laypeople assess which national-level tradeoffs are tolerable and their implicit 
views of the value of a statistical life to society (that is, including rather than specifically censoring 
considerations of altruism). Combining regulatory choice interpretation with cost-benefit analysis 
might then yield systematic study of “regulatory choice analysis,” incorporating how institutions do, 
and perhaps should, assess and value different tradeoffs, including alternative distributions of risks 
and costs.  
4.6. Study Limitations 
 We review in turn five possible limitations of this study:  
 (1) We sampled from a diverse but not statistically representative online panel of Americans, 
with a 50% response rate. Men and college graduates, and to some degree the more probabilistically 
numerate, were more likely to respond to the survey than their proportions in the overall panel (see 
first author for details). These data suggest our results may have over-represented the views of 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
29 
most risk perception and stated-preference economic studies intended to estimate the value of a 
statistical life (VSL) use even less diverse or representative samples, with lower response rates.16  
 (2) We used a narrow set of examples even within our focus on health and safety 
regulations, as a consequence of our wish to probe a wide variety of topics in this exploratory study 
of regulatory cost perceptions, and to avoid making our 16-treatment experimental design even 
more complex. The risk interpretation literature shows that hazards differ widely in perceived risk 
magnitude or probability, and that different groups of hazard managers differ widely in how much 
they are trusted. Thus, particularly to help generalize about how people respond to regulatory cost 
estimates from across government, future research should assess variance across multiple hazards 
and agencies, while controlling for perceived risk and trust. 
 (3) Several pages at the start of our instrument introduced our subjects to the unfamiliar 
world of regulatory costs, trying to relate it to daily tasks and familiar risks and expenditures, so that 
when we began asking questions the answers might be at least partly informed by specific 
knowledge. However, we did not test how well our respondents understood this background 
material or whether (or how often) they used it, and we did not test systematically other types or 
amounts of contextual information. Nor did we test whether there were order effects (e.g., of having 
the surprise paragraph precede rather than follow the VSL sentence). All such factors merit future 
research, to assure responses on such a difficult topic better reflect respondent preferences, which 
(with certain exceptions—e.g., those based on ideological heuristics) are probably constructed “on 
the fly.” 
(4) Our questions on uncertain regulatory-impact estimates were preceded by a complex 
process of personalizing each subject’s range of acceptable tradeoffs between lives and costs, to 
ensure that subsequent ranges of cost estimates would have to fall within (“narrow” uncertainty) or 
                                                          
16
 This remark does not apply to revealed-preference methods for estimating VSL, but these methods face 
other imputation challenges (e.g., they assume that workers’ perceived and objective risks are equivalent, that 
workers are fully informed about risks and able to negotiate wages, and that resulting wage premiums are 
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outside (“wide” uncertainty) a respondent’s own area of ambiguity about tolerable or intolerable 
tradeoffs. This process poses several potential problems: (a) errors if people could not understand 
the process; (b) no probing of tradeoffs common to all respondents (e.g., if everyone had been asked 
to compare a regulation that saved 1000 lives for $6.4 billion with certainty, against one that saved 
1000 lives for a cost that might fall between $1 billion and $11.8 billion, with a mean of $6.4 billion); 
and (c) lability or changeability of responses, given that the task of assessing national tradeoffs, and 
the large numbers entailed, may both have been outside personal experience. Errors with the slider 
were only 2% (4% if we include those who did not provide any slider-related information), but we 
did not directly probe for other errors. We acknowledge that the complex process of personalizing 
might alter responses to subsequent questions, but argue that the main issue is how to elicit 
responses to meaningful questions. If through personalizing we present to respondents uncertain 
ranges that mean something to them, we obtain far more valid answers—however different—than 
those derived from presenting meaningless uncertainties. That our respondents put in considerable 
work on this survey (median = 38 minutes) suggests they were treating it seriously, and thus that 
their responses merit respect despite their potential flaws. 
(5) Finally, potential lability could undermine the validity of all such results: if people 
construct their preferences on the fly, with possibly little context or motivation, can findings be 
trusted? However, this challenge is not unique to our approach (or, indeed, to studies of economic 
or risk perceptions generally). If there is lability, it likely affects imputation of the value of a 
statistical life based on stated preferences (covered elsewhere(18)) far more than our results on 
responses to regulatory costs. In fact, we believe this is a unique strength of our approach. By 
allowing the respondent to set his or her own uncertainty bounds (i.e., points at which tradeoffs that 
are “definitely” acceptable or unacceptable become tradeoffs for which support or opposition 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
31 
provided (common tradeoff choice) nor one the respondent selected.17 However, future test-retest 
designs, with measures of motivation and understanding, would increase confidence in this 
method’s validity and reliability. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has established that citizens process and react to information about regulatory costs in 
rich, nuanced, and idiosyncratic ways, that they labor under some misimpressions about costs, but 
also that they deserve more regulatory-cost information than agencies tend to provide. All such 
statements, of course, also apply to risk information, and on both the “risk side” and the “cost side” 
of the cost-benefit ledger, expert assessments and lay perceptions have valid foundations and 
should be reconciled rather than pitted against each other. Results from this survey suggest that 
agency cost-benefit analysts should be more interested in, and responsive to, public interpretations 
of presumed systematic bias in cost estimation, uncertainty in regulatory cost, and inequality in how 
regulatory costs are borne.  
 Clearly, advances in the field of risk interpretation have improved the practice of quantitative 
risk assessment and have altered regulatory decisions. For example, a major impetus for the 
evolution away from bright-line pronouncements about non-cancer health effects(69) is the 
normative concern that the citizenry should not be told that “safety” is dichotomous, but that it 
depends on the probability of harm. Understanding the difference between risk as assessed and as 
experienced can lead to different decisions: for example, NHTSA recently promulgated a back-up 
camera rule(70) whose assessed total costs exceeded total benefits, on the grounds that averting 
accidents in which parents strike their own small children while backing up their cars had benefits 
not fully captured by standard VSL methods. 
 Advances in regulatory cost interpretation have similar potential to improve the practice of cost-
benefit analysis and to change the way agencies balance competing objectives on behalf of the 
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 The instructions read: “Do the best you can. . . . Don’t push yourself too hard, however; there’s no ‘right’ 
answer, and we just want your best guess as to where your line lies between being supportive and being 
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citizenry. Table V offers some indications of how governments might provide better information on 
uncertainties, biases, and distributions of cost in light of how these inevitable (whether made explicit 
or not) factors affect public perceptions. We emphasize in conclusion that our findings about cost 
implicate the benefits side of the ledger as well, since nearly all agency benefits estimates derive 
from investigations into willingness-to-pay or other stated-preference studies. Practitioners assume 
that all current VSL    (and quality-adjusted-life-year) measures are gauging the value of benefits in 
dollars, but they are really estimating their value in “costs as experienced by those who bear them.” 
Understanding more about cost interpretation therefore is the key to understanding both what our 
hazard management system takes away and what it bestows. 
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Table I. Judged Accuracy of EPA Estimates of Regulation Impacts 
 Underestimate Accurate Overestimate 
Individual Dimension  
Costs 52.8% 39.5% 7.7% 
Lives 24.6% 57.8% 17.6% 
Overall Sample 
Both 13.2% 29.2% 1.1% 
Regulatory Bias (pro- or anti-) 
(column cell refers to judged costs with lives deemed 
misestimated in the opposite direction; e.g., 13.3% saw 








Inaccurate on this dimension, accurate on the other 26.3% Costs 
7.1% Lives 
NA 2.3% Costs 
3.2% Lives 
NA = not applicable  
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Table II. Number of Respondents Offering Specific Explanations for Expected EPA Misestimates of 
Regulatory Costs and Benefits 
 Costs  Benefits (Lives Saved) 
Explanation Overestimate Underestimate  Overestimate Underestimate 
Estimate-specific      
Environmental issues 
expensive 
0 10  NA NA 
Difficulty of removing soot 0 33  0 0 
Omitted costs 0 24  NA NA 
Other mortality causes (e.g., 
“I doubt soot is the sole 
cause of these respiratory 
deaths”) 
NA NA  22 0 
Too few saved/ineffective NA NA  13 0 
Technological innovation 12 0  1 2 
Morbidity co-benefits NA NA  0 14 
Underestimate air quality as 
cause (e.g., dose/response 
relation stronger; more 
afflicted than known; 
population growth) 
NA NA  0 39 
Other (cost change; pollution 
change; regulations get 
stricter each year) 
10 3  0 0 
Other      
Regulated business 
malfeasance (e.g., 
“companies that must buy 
the new equipment will 
make it a point to overshoot 
the EPA's estimated cost”) 
0 8  2 1 
Deliberate (e.g., “they don’t 
really want to do” it; “tend 
to underestimate costs . . . 
to get the bill passed”) 
6 40  18 7 
Surprises happen (e.g., “costs 
. . . are not really 
predictable”) 
3 47  18 0 
General tendency to 
misestimate of “they,” 
“government,” “the agency” 
or “EPA”  
7 133  15 3 
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 Costs  Benefits (Lives Saved) 
Explanation Overestimate Underestimate  Overestimate Underestimate 
General doubts (e.g., “distrust 
figures [of] government 
agencies”) 
6 0  5 3 
TOTAL EXPLANATIONS 
44 298  94 69 
No answer (including non-
explanations [e.g., offsetting 
health benefits] and 
polemics), don’t know, and 
unclassifiable 
20 111  40 100 
Total Commenters 57 393  131 183* 
NA = Not applicable (authors’ judgment that this explanation does not logically apply to this impact). 
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Agency Uncertainty about Costs       
The agency is being honest. 3.15 
(1.05) 
6.5% 21.1% 30.5% 33.5% 7.5% 




6.9% 25.8% 36.0% 23.4% 6.7% 
I trust an agency that says this. 2.84 
(1.02) 
10.8% 24.5% 37.1% 22.3% 3.9% 
This uncertainty is due to the 
inherent difficulty of estimating 




2.6% 10.8% 22.4% 50.0% 13.7% 
An agency that is uncertain about 
regulatory costs will be uncertain 
about regulatory benefits too. 
3.58 
(0.98) 
2.2% 14.4% 21.5% 46.5% 14.7% 
Distribution of Regulatory Costs       
Whatever the distribution of 
regulatory costs is for an individual 
regulation, over the long run the 
impact of regulatory costs for all 
regulations collectively will average 
out to about the same amount for 
every business or customer. 
2.93 
(1.05) 
8.6% 28.5% 26.9% 31.5% 3.6% 
A non-equal distribution of 
regulatory costs is ethically justified 
only if the people who pay more 




8.2% 19.1% 28.5% 35.5% 7.8% 
Uncertainty: Respondents were asked for “reactions when a government agency says it ‘doesn’t know with a 
high degree of certainty how much the regulation will cost.’ " 
Percentages do not sum to 100, as they omit missing responses. N = 733–742. 
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Table IV. Selected Multivariate Analyses 
 
Topics and Dependent 
Variables Significant Associations Summary Statistics 
Insignificant 
Associations 
Beliefs about Regulatory Costs 
Ratio of own estimate to 
NHTSA estimate of roof-
strengthening costs 
Probabilistic numeracy  
-332.34, p = .000 
White -1009.66, p = .039 
R
2
 = .06; R
2




estimate costs; other 
experimental effects 
Interactions Surprise * VSL -4228.10, p 
= .005; Agency * Surprise * 
VSL -4031.4, p = .05; 
Anchor * Surprise * VSL -
4849.78, p = .023 
R
2
 = .10; R
2
adj = .04 
Beliefs about Agency Estimates of Regulatory Impacts 
Over-estimation of costs, 
relative to under-estimation 
Full-time jobs .32 (.13-.78), 
p = .011 
Unfair share of regulatory 
costs .77 (.60-.99), p = .04 
Expect to pay equal share, 
relative to pay more than 
their share 3.50 (1.11-
11.09), p = .033 
Model correctly 
predicted 60.0% of 
cases, exceeding 
proportional by chance 
accuracy rate of 55.9% 
(n = 503; goodness of fit 
*deviance χ
2
] = 812.46, p 
= 1.000; Nagelkerke 
pseudo-R
2
 = .19) 
Numeracy items; 
other demographics; 
need for regulation; 
experimental effects  
Over-estimation of lives 
saved, relative to under-
estimation 
Politically conservative 
1.45 (1.15-1.82), p = .002 
Probabilistic numeracy 
1.25 (1.08-1.44), p = .003 
Unfair share 1.19 (1.00-
1.42), p = .046  
Model correctly 
predicted 56.3% of 
cases, exceeding 
proportional by chance 
accuracy rate of 50.7% 
(n = 503; goodness of fit 
*deviance χ
2
] = 924.57, p 
= .82; Nagelkerke 
pseudo-R
2
 = .17) 
Subjective numeracy; 
other demographics; 
need for regulation; 




Interactions  Anchor * Surprise * VSL 
30.00 (1.04-863.50), p = 
.047 
Model correctly 
predicted 58.3% of 
cases (n = 503; 
goodness of fit 
*deviance χ
2
] = 901.51, p 
= .82; Nagelkerke 
pseudo-R
2
 = .21) 
Attitudes toward Certain versus Uncertain Estimates of Regulatory Costs and Benefits 
Support for uncertainty 
(wide > narrow > certain), 
relative to support for 
certainty (certain > narrow > 
wide) 
Over-estimation of costs, 
relative to under-
estimation 4.16 (1.32-
13.16), p = .015 
Model correctly 
predicted 57.2% of 
cases, exceeding 
proportional by chance 
accuracy rate of 48.9%  
(n = 376; goodness of fit 
*deviance χ
2
] = 681.88, p 




agency accuracy on 
lives; imputed VSL; 
tradeoff ambiguity 
  
 Accurate on costs, relative 
to under-estimation 2.89 
(1.33-6.28), p = .007 
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Topics and Dependent 
Variables Significant Associations Summary Statistics 
Insignificant 
Associations 
 Probabilistic numeracy .83 
(.70-.98), p = .03 
pseudo-R
2
 = .19) 
 
 
Preferences for Distribution of Regulatory Costs 
Support for non-equal 
random distributions (1% pay 
$10,000 > 1% pay $500 > 
equal distributions), relative 
to support for equal 
distributions (equal 
distributions > 1% pay $500 > 
1% pay $10,000) 
Traffic, relative to 
carcinogen, hazard 2.05 
(1.18-3.56), p = .011  
Agency admission that 
cost estimate is uncertain 
indicates agency is 
trustworthy and honest 
.59 (.42-.82), p = .002 
Model correctly 
predicted 65.2% of 
cases, exceeding 
proportional by chance 
accuracy rate of 59.7% 
(n = 488; goodness of fit 
*deviance χ
2
] = 820.74, p 
= 1.00; Nagelkerke 
pseudo-R
2






Note. For the regulatory costs row, initial numbers in the second column are unstandardized correlation coefficients. R
2
 
(third column, first data row) is the variance explained in the dependent variable by the collective independent variables; 
R
2
adj is this number adjusted to account for differences in the number of independent variables across different linear 
regression analyses. The closer R
2
 is to 1.00, the more variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent 
variables. For subsequent data rows, initial numbers in the second column include the odds ratio, and its 95% confidence 
intervals in parentheses. If the odds ratio > 1.00, the people with the belief or attitude listed first in the first column are, 
compared to those listed second in the first column, more likely to have the belief or attribute, or been exposed to the 
experimental manipulation, listed in the second column. Proportional by chance accuracy rate (third column, all but first 
data row) is equal to a 25% improvement in classification of cases over the rate of accuracy achievable by chance alone. If 
the model’s correct classification of cases, the most interpretable criterion for the usefulness of a logistic regression result, 
exceeds the proportional by chance accuracy rate, this indicates at least minimal adequacy. Summary statistics are 
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Table V. Summary of Selected Findings and Interpretations for Practice 
Major Findings Practical Interpretations 
Beliefs about Regulatory Costs  
1) People grossly over-estimated the unit costs of 
a regulation (i.e., how much it costs to double the 
strength of a car roof), and to a lesser extent 
under-estimated its total scope (national 
production of cars) 
This may help explain beliefs about agency under-
estimation of regulatory costs (#2 below). People 
who believe it is very expensive to reduce risks 
may regard agency cost estimates as “too good to 
be true,” which may hinder agencies trying to 
educate citizens, or engage the public in 
deliberations, on regulatory costs 
Beliefs about Agency Estimates of Regulatory Impacts 
2) A majority of respondents believe that EPA 
under-estimates costs 
This belief is likely to hamper any effort to educate 
citizens about scholarly findings that cost over-
estimation is the more common result of agency 
behavior 
3) A majority deems EPA accurate about lives 
saved 
This belief may reassure EPA and perhaps other 
health and safety agencies, but how far it applies 
across agencies remains to be seen  
4) Reasons volunteered for belief in EPA mis-
estimation of costs or benefits range from 
general distrust of government (or extrapolations 
from cost overruns on home or government 
construction projects) to sophisticated impact-
specific arguments about difficulties in estimating 
outcomes  
This apparent diversity of mental models of 
agencies’ analytic competence offers both 
opportunities and barriers for agency discussions 
with citizens about the limits to and accuracy of 
regulatory impact assessments 
5) Agencies that present cost estimates that are 
uncertain divide citizens as to agency honesty, 
trustworthiness, and competence 
Agencies that follow risk communicators’ advice to 
discuss uncertainties in their work, in both risk 
assessments and cost estimates, should expect 
diverse public reactions 
Attitudes Toward Certain versus Uncertain Cost Estimates 
6) A regulation with an estimate of regulatory 
impacts that was certain or narrowly uncertain 
(within one’s own zone of uncertainty about 
tolerable tradeoffs of costs and lives saved) 
received similar two-thirds support.  This held 
true when these conditions were evaluated 
separately, both overall and for those reacting to 
estimates of regulatory costs only (i.e., excluding 
those who saw uncertain estimates of lives 
saved). When they were contrasted directly, 
there was slightly more support for narrow 
uncertainty than certainty in the full sample, but 
slightly less among those reacting to regulatory-
cost estimates 
Although finding #5 (above) indicates mixed 
feelings about an agency’s direct expression of 
uncertainty in its estimates, distaste for the 
experience of narrow (person-specific) uncertainty 
was far less than one might expect from general 
statements that people avoid uncertainty, even 
when only uncertainty in regulatory costs (rather 
than benefits) was included. This suggests that 
narrow (as defined by professionals) uncertainty in 
impact estimates might be acceptable to many or 
even most citizens if the reasons were clearly 
explained  
7) A regulation with a widely uncertain estimate Clearly a regulation with widely uncertain 
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Major Findings Practical Interpretations 
of impacts (i.e., simultaneous possibility that the 
outcome could be definitely acceptable, 
definitely unacceptable, or indefinitely 
acceptable to the respondent) received support 
from half of the sample when evaluated alone, 
whether overall or for costs alone; a third of the 
sample supported that regulation over the same 
regulation with a certain estimate (preferred by 
about half the sample), and a quarter when 
considering only regulatory costs 
estimates (relative to a person’s own uncertainty 
about acceptable tradeoffs) was less acceptable 
than its narrowly uncertain or certain 
counterparts, but support for such a regulation 
was still surprisingly high.  Such support was  
associated with positive reactions to agency 
uncertainty (possibly reflecting general trust in 
government) and low numeracy, among other 
factors.  In practice, it is unclear how people would 
respond to “wide” uncertainties in professional 
(not person-specific) estimates  
(8) Nearly one-quarter of respondents changed 
their views substantially about the hypothetical 
regulation when its cost (or its benefit) was 
surrounded by “wide uncertainty.”  This effect 
was slightly more pronounced when cost was 
made uncertain as opposed to benefit. 
Preferences for Distribution of Regulatory Costs 
9) Equal distribution of regulatory costs across 
households was preferred, with unequal 
distributions preferred to be random rather than 
determined by income 
Considering both those respondents who reacted 
very favorably and very unfavorably to wide 
uncertainty, it is clear that suppressing 
information about cost (or benefit) uncertainty 
can evoke public responses that differ from fully-
informed responses. 
 
This preference is not surprising in the U.S., but 
given the likely unequal actual distribution of 
regulatory costs, actual distributions may not be 
politically acceptable if and when these are 
publicized 
10) The fairness of equal inter-individual 
distributions of regulatory cost was controversial, 
whether in the short run for a regulation 
affecting a universally-used commodity or in the 
long run balance of multiple regulations’ impacts 
The gap between equality and equity in preferred 
regulatory cost distributions may raise the value of 
agencies stressing that they lack foreknowledge of 
who ultimately will pay regulatory costs, while 
increasing pressure upon them to know more 
about likely or experienced distributions 
 
